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INTRODUCTION

On July 1 2002, I began my work for President Bush as the senior
economist for international finance at the Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA). "The CEA was established by the Employment Act of
1946 to provide the President with economic analysis and advice on the
objective development and implementation of a wide range of domestic
and international economic policy issues." 1 The name "Council"
sounds as though there are a large stable of economists at the
President's beck and call. In reality, there are actually only three
members on the council with eight senior staff specialists like myself. 2
During my year of service, the CEA was given less attention by the
Administration than was merited by our small size. The purpose of this
essay is to explain how good intentions and good international policy
are sometimes sacrificed for strategic interests. But mainly, I provide
my (largely unheeded) advice on IMF reform.
Let me begin by providing some background on the good
intentions of the administration prior to my arrival. On July 17, 2001,
President Bush urged reform of the International Financial Institutions
(IFI) including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
and other development banks, by calling for "compassionate
conservatism at an international level. " 3 One way to make the world
more stable and just, he said, was "to work in true partnership with
developing countries to help them overcome obstacles to their
development, such as illiteracy, disease, and unsustainable debt. ,,,i
The backbone of this call to reform came from a Congressional
commission headed by Allan H. Meltzer, of Carnegie Mellon
University, which provided a long list of recommendations early in
2000. 5 The Meltzer Commission showed that, among other things, the
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IMF is largely failing in its mission to address economic stability. 6
However, the Commission unanimously supported a proposal
maintaininf that the IMF continues to restrict short-term crises
assistance. Why limit IMF assistance? Since the IMF provides funds
to countries in need, the expectation of such assistance creates moral
hazard or incentives that encourage reckless behavior and bad policies
for countries. In other words, countries may not make necessary
economic reforms because they believe that the IMF will bail them out
during difficult times, especially if there is an important strategic
interest in preventing a country from economic crisis.
This is not merely a theoretical consideration. Many analysts have
pointed to the amount and persistence of capital flows to Russia before
August 1998 as an example of why the IMF needs reform. 8 They argue
that this financial assistance went to a privileged few without making
the economy more stable. 9 On November 9, 2001, in the United States
Treasury's Report on Implementation of Recommendations Made by
the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission, the
Administration stated that "higher standards for qualification help
mitigate potential moral hazard concerns related to the greater assurance
of the ability to borrow." 10
With this information in mind, I went to Washington believing that
IMF reform was both beneficial and imminent. I left Washington
having learned a valuable lesson - sometimes good economic policy is
sacrificed when the political cost is too great. In the remainder of my
essay, I lay out strategies for effective IMF reform that were largely
ignored in the past and conclude with possible reasons why such reform
was not made.
THE CASE FOR REFORM

The IMF is an international organization of 184 member
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countries. 11 According to its articles of agreement, the purpose of the
IMF is to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange
stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth
and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial
assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment. 12
While the IMF is chartered to provide funds to encourage stability,
the track record suggests that international moral hazard may be
Since
preventing the IMF from achieving its laudable goal.
international risk spiked in the 1990s (see Table 1), 106 countries have
been on IMF programs. Most countries have spent more time in a
program than not and most countries have been in multiple programs
despite increasing efforts to impose conditionality (see Figure 1). 13
Increasing Financial Risks since Mid 1980s
Table 1

1985 1989 1993 1997 2001

TheIMF
Total debt in arrears (bill $)0.14.13.93.03.0
#Countries in arrears: 14 11 13 27 45
Top 3/Total Exposure(%) 3036 40 60 53

The World Bank
Total debt in arrears (bill $) 0.1 3.82.52.22.4
# Countries in arrears 1 9 7 78

The Bigger the Loan, the Harder the Economic Fall

Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that for those countries who received
large IMF packages, more money did not lead to successful graduation
from IMF programs. This means that they are the only two countries,
Korea and Mexico, which received large packages and did not spend a
11. About the IMF at http://www.imf.org/extemal/about.htm.
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. I, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited May 26, 2004).
13. This occurred even as structural conditions imposed on each program increased
eight fold.
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large portion of time in an IMF program. 14 [Brazil, Indonesia, and
Turkey are also exceptions, but are still on an IMF program (censored)
and so their fate remains to be seen.] Even for Korea and Mexico, it is
important to note other factors besides the IMF that helped each
country.
For
Mexico,
the
U.S. intervention and loan guarantee surely had some affect on the
outcome. 15 For Korea, Kim Dae Jung's leadership was quintessential
by moving to reform the bankin~ sector and engage in corporate
restructuring before he took power. 1
IMF OPTIMISM LEADS TO OVER EXTENDED CREDIT
Since 1994, the IMF has announced 20 new large financing
arrangements and has overestimated the ability to repay in practically
every case. 17 The IMF either over-estimated GDP growth or underestimated inflation, in every case but two. (See Table 1) On average,
the IMF forecasted growth to be 3 percent higher than the actual
outcome and forecasted inflation to be 19 percent lower. The bias, or
degree to which the IMF over-estimated growth or under-estimated
inflation, is highly related to the size of the package. Formal estimation
shows that for every $2 billion increase of IMF financing, GDP growth
is over-estimated by 0.5 percent. 18 Formal estimation also shows that
this large increase in IMF financing has the estimated effect of a 6
percent increase on the probability that a country will return for more
funds later. 19

14. Figure 1 also demonstrates that Turkey, Indonesia and Brazil are outside the range.
These cannot statistically be considered successes as it is still too early to determine the
impact of the program given that the observations are right-censored. More to the point, one
does not need statistical analysis to motivate the point that Brazil and Turkey are on
sustainable trajectories.
15. For example, see Jeff Sachs "Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?"
Frank Graham Memorial Lecture at Princeton University (April, 1995) , available at
http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf
16. For example, Kim Dae Jung met with Chaebols even before taking office to
encourage restructuring. See Edward Graham, Reforming Korea's Industrial Conglomerates,
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 2003.
17. See figure 3. In every case but Russia '99 and Indonesia '00, the IMF forecast was
either too high for growth, or too low for inflation.
18. Admittedly, these regressions may suffer from few degrees of freedom (33) and
omitted variable bias. Still, it is instructive that the impact of the IMF Loan/Quota on Bias
is statistically significant at all conventional levels with at-stat of 4.10.
19. Author's calculation using a simple probit model allowing financing to influence
the probability of default.
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IMF OVER-PREDICTS THE ABILITY TO REPAY FUNDS
The Potential Risks to the U.S. Taxpayer

In the previous section, I argued that reforming the IMF is
beneficial for the developing world. In this section, I explain that
reforming the IMF would be beneficial to the United States as well. To
better illustrate this point, I provide a primer on IMF accounting and
then relate the IMF balance sheet to the U.S. balance sheet to
demonstrate that international moral hazard has an impact on the United
States. I prove this by showing that the last transfer of wealth from the
United States to the IMF did not improve the financial well-being of the
IMF, but may have been a waste of US assets. Finally, I provide a
menu of options for IMF reform.
IMF financing works as follows: countries maintain their quota of
reserves and during balance of payment (BOP) crises, draw on
resources through purchase-repurchase agreements called "reserve
tranche positions." The procedure is self-financed because each country
borrows at a given interest rate and must repay the foreign currency. 20
Usable IMF assets are roughly $230 billion with outstanding credit of
$75 billion and precautionary balances, which act as a cushion, of about
$7 billion. 21 Yet, these transactions have little direct impact on the U.S.
budget. After the initial stock of gold was given to establish the U.S.
quota, the annual cost to maintaining the quota is actually quite small.
Therefore, in 2001, the U.S. earned $153 million in interest, but paid
$201 million in financing and currency adjustments leading to a net
payment of $4 7 million. 22
However, this does not mean that U.S. citizens are not liable.
Previously, the United States made large transfers to the IMF without
being scored on the budget. 23 For example, when the United States
allocated an additional $17.9 billion to the IMF in 1999, there was also

20. Administrative costs ($450 million) are shared between creditors and debtors. The
relative burden of these costs in the early 1980's was 25% to 30% for debtors, whereas
creditors bore a 70% to 75% burden. These statistics are essentially counter-cyclical, so
during the heavy growth years of the late 1990's it switched, with a 70% to 75% burden on
debtors and a 25% to 30% burden on creditors.
21. IMF balance sheet available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/fin.htm.
22. See Quarterly Report to Congress on Financial Implications of U.S. Participation in
the
International
Monetary
Fund,
available
at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/reports/feb2002/pdf.
23. See Congress' Joint Economic Committee Statement, chaired by Jim Saxton,
March, 1998, available at http://www.house/gov/jec/imf.htm.
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no direct budget cost. 24 U.S. quota subscriptions involve an exchange
of monetary assets between the Treasury and IMF and are not counted
as budgetary outlays. There is also an obvious opportunity cost of
transferring assets to the IMF. However, one might argue that such a
transfer improved the financial health of the IMF and therefore had no
net financial impact on United States.
One way to measure the health of the IMF is to compare its
financial commitments (liquid liabilities) with available resources (net
uncommitted resources), termed the liquidity ratio. Figure 4 (see
Appendix) shows that the current liquidity ratio has fallen from its year
2000 peak and appears to be headed back to the point when the last
quota increase occurred.
Figure 5 also depicts two counterfactuals - one in which there was
no quota increase and another with a quota increase proportional to 3
percent per year. 25 If quotas had not been increased, the liquidity ratio
would be practically zero, meaning that the IMF has drained all its 1998
resources. Under a more reasonable assumption of increasing quotas
with the general trend of the economy (i.e., 3 percent per year),
stabilization appears following the Asian and Russian crises, but took a
tum for the worse in the last two years. It therefore does not appear that
the quota increase made the IMF more financially sound.
On the contrary, the IMF employed the quota increase to overextend itself to just a few countries, putting it in a precarious position if
any of these countries default. Figure 5 depicts the results from an
analogous exercise by looking at liquidity ratio of top indebted
countries (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey) ignoring all other loans
and assuming the full amount is drawn. This shows again that quota
increases have not been used to improve the liquidity of the IMF.
So, what would happen if a country defaulted on a large loan?
Credit outstanding, as of February 6, 2003, is roughi>' $75 billion of
which Argentina, Brazil and Turkey owe $68 billion. 2 The remaining
24. See S. Res. 2334, 105th Cong. (1999) (enacted). The $17.9 billion consisted of
$14.5 billion for the United States' quota increase and $3.4 billion for a backup line of credit
for the fund. One quarter of that $14.5 billion quota increase, or about $3.6 billion, was
actually transferred to the IMF and the rest was put in a letter of credit, which the IMF could
draw on as needed.
25. For each case, I assume size does not matter and therefore the amount borrowed is
unaffected by the size of the quotas. This may be a restrictive assumption, but deriving the
demand for loans would require similar heroic assumptions.
26. These three countries have similar loans, with Moody's giving Argentina the lowest
possible rating of a "Ca" and rating Brazil and Turkey as "Bl," each below what is
considered "investment grade." Moody's Sovereign Debt Rating, various issues.
Researchers at Moody's show that a company rated in the C range over five years has a 50%
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countries have much smaller loans, so precautionary balances are
sufficient to compensate losses. However, if any of the three larger
loans went into default, the situation is more troubling as there are no
sufficient precautionary balances to offset such a default. This is a very
important area in which the IMF and the United States need reform.
I believe there are three options to finance a large default.
The first of these options is to employ the interest-burden sharing
mechanism. In this scenario, those countries with larger shares would
have larger burdens. 27 A default of $20 billion (i.e., $4 billion less than
Turkey's profile) would cost the U.S. $2.5 billion over the next five
years (unless more burden is shifted towards the debtor). The
challenges are: A) the spread between what a country may receive and
what a country may charge is limited [tranche rate can be a maximum of
80% of lending rate]; B) the agreement requires a 70 percent majority
vote; and C) the burden-sharing mechanism is too severe for debtor
countries. Hence, there is not enough interest-sharing available to cover
such a default.
The second option is to pay for this one-time loss with unused
capital such as gold. The challenges associated with this option include:
A) valuing gold as $8 billion on the books when its actual worth is $31
billion at current market prices, which of course might decline on the
news of a large sale by IMF. Moreover, drawing down gold reserves is
a one-time solution unless there is a policy to replenish the gold; 28 and
B) it requires a 70 percent majority agreement. While there is no direct
cost to the United States, such a large scale sale of gold is unlikely to be
an acceptable option.
The third and final option is to tap into the portion of assets that are
usable, and then require countries to replenish their quotas accordingly.
The burden would then be directly proportional to their quota share.
Therefore, the direct cost to the United States would be $5 billion over
five years. Such action would demonstrate that the $17 .9 billion quota
increase in 1999 should have been scored on the U.S. budget and should
change the manner in which IMF is funded. If the United States moved
to an on-budget facility, accounting for a large loan would depend on
probability of default and companies in the Bl range have a 25% probability. Both Brazil
and Argentina have had "Bl" ratings for five years, and Argentina has had "C" range ratings
for two years. Id.
27. For example, the US is responsible for about 25% of the creditor cost with the G-7
totaling about 60%.
28. This has been done in the past when a trust fund was established for Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) [36 countries totaling $7 billion], and Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) [27 countries totaling $1 billion].
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the terms, conditions, and credit rating of the country. Hypothetically,
an analogously large 10-year loan to a country like Turkey at treasury
interest rates +200 basis points for first five years, then graduated to
treasuries +500 basis points with a 4-year grace period would cost the
United States by slightly over $1 billion using the U.S. government's
credit-rating methodology. This is the best option, and one that has
never been considered.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this essay has been two-fold. First, I intended to
demonstrate that IMF reform is necessary and even provided a menu of
options on how the United States might encourage such reform when
financing a large scale default. Second, I intended to provide an
explanation of why such reform has not occurred and is unlikely to
occur in the near future.
Much of economics is about maximizing objectives subject to
constraints. In the case I have described, the constraint is largely
political. It is very difficult to mobilize interest in reforming the IMF
during times of crisis such as the War in Iraq. I believe IMF reform
requires moving to a system where the cost to the U.S. taxpayer from
IMF assistance is made transparent. This means that the U.S. taxpayer
would be made directly responsible for loans made to our allies or loans
made during war to prevent additional financial crises. If such reform
were to occur, the U.S. taxpayer would lik~ly discourage lending that
works at cross-purposes to the strategic goal. Once the War in Iraq
occurred, any chance at true reform was pre-empted as focus was
shifted away from such reform, especially because it would make these
economic costs more transparent to the U.S. taxpayer. To this end, the
War in Iraq has cast a long shadow on international economic policy.
So, what has occurred in the place of reform? Countries like
Argentina continue to suffer as the IMF continues to send mixed
messages about its seriousness for structural reform. The United States
taxpayer continues to be liable for non-performing loans by countries
such as Argentina, but due to the fiction of current U.S. accounting, the
U.S. is unaware of the risk. Finally, the IMF continues to be in denial
about its portfolio which is not without risk.
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Figure 1:
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Figure 3:
Count~
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Figure 4
Figure 1: Factual vs. Counterfactual Liquidity Ratios of IMF
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Figure 5:
Figure 2: Factual vs. Counterfactual Possible Liquidity Ratios
of Top 3 Debtors in IMF
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